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Part I. Introduction
On August 31, 2009, the World Trade Organization's Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) issued a ruling that ended a seven-year
dispute between Brazil and the United States over U.S. subsidies
on upland cotton.' Brazil had previously won a claim that U.S.
subsidies enabled farmers to produce cotton at a lower cost,
thereby undercutting the world price and creating a hardship for
farmers from Brazil and other major cotton-producing countries.2
The DSB ordered the United States to remove these subsidies in
2005, but the United States failed to comply by the deadline.3 As
a result, Brazil asked the DSB to authorize trade sanctions, and the
August 2009 ruling was the DSB's response to Brazil's request.'
The DSB approved sanctions that were quite dramatic. In
most cases, trade sanctions must correspond with the underlying
violation. For example, Brazil would normally be required to
retaliate against illegal U. S. cotton subsidies by imposing tariffs
on U.S. cotton, or at least on other goods.' In this case, however,
the DSB authorized Brazil, under certain conditions, to "cross
retaliate:" 6 Brazil could issue sanctions against U.S. exports in
1 Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, WT/D5267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31, 2009), http://docsonline.wto.org (follow "Simple
Search" hyperlink; search Doc. Symbol WT/D5267/ARB/1).
2 Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8,
2004).
3 See World Trade Organization, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/cases e/ds267 e.htm (last visited Oct. 28,
2010).
4 Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, supra note 1.
5 International trade in goods is regulated among World Trade Organization
(WTO) members by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
6 Brazil must first demonstrate that a certain level of sanctions are permitted
before it could use the right. Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report, United States-
Subsidies on Upland Cotton, supra note 1, T 5.230.
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services' or intellectual property rights.! This Comment will focus
on Brazil's options for suspension of intellectual property rights,
which are regulated by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).
The DSB has only allowed a country to cross retaliate in two
prior cases, illustrating the unique nature of this remedy. The first
instance was in 2000, when the DSB ruled that Ecuador could
cross retaliate against the European Communities (EC). 9 The EC
had failed to implement a DSB judgment that EC trading practices
discriminated against Ecuadorian bananas."o The remedy was
issued a second time in 2007, after Antigua and Barbuda
[hereinafter Antigua] successfully challenged a U.S. law
prohibiting the cross-border supply of online gambling services."
Neither country opted to exercise this right. Instead, Ecuador used
the right as leverage to negotiate greater market access for their
banana exports, while Antigua is still in settlement talks with the
United States.12
The remedy of cross retaliation is very important for Brazil.
The cotton case was a breakthrough for developing countries
challenging U.S. agricultural policy. Brazil has been advocating
for agricultural reform within the WTO's Doha Round of trade
negotiations-which have been ongoing since 2001-but has had
7 International trade in services is regulated among WTO members by the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IB, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
8 International protection of intellectual property rights is provided by the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
9 The European Union is known as the "European Communities" at the World
Trade Organization. See Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24,
2000) [hereinafter EC-Bananas Ill].
10 See infra Part II.B.i.
11 See infra Part II.B.ii.
12 JAMES MCCALL SMITH, COMPLIANCE BARGAINING IN THE WTO: ECUADOR AND
THE BANANAS DISPUTE (2003) reprinted in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA, 257 (J. Odell ed., Cambridge University Press
2006); see also Decision by the Arbitrator, United States - Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21,
2007).
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little success challenging the strong U.S. farming sector." Cross
retaliation offers Brazil a new policy tool as it seeks to induce the
United States to adopt development-friendly agricultural policies.
The threat of cross retaliation is also very important to the
United States. Unlike Ecuador or Antigua, Brazil is one of the ten
largest economies, has significant industrial capabilities, and is
capable of implementing a cross retaliation plan.14 With the right
of cross retaliation, Brazil could pit two politically powerful U.S.
sectors against each other. The agricultural sector is well
represented in Congress and by special interest groups, and cotton
subsidies in the United States are in large part a result of this
influence. On the other hand, the United States has a strong
economic interest in protecting intellectual property rights, which
safeguard valuable patented technologies and copyrighted
entertainment products. Thus, the United States may be forced to
reform its agricultural policies or lose revenue from intellectual
property sources.
Although no country has exercised the right of cross
retaliation, the DSB gave some guidance in its decision in the
Ecuador case-known as EC-Bananas III-about how to
implement such a plan." Subsequently, several authors have
proposed mechanisms for using cross retaliation under the TRIPS
Agreement, taking into account concurrent treaties protecting
intellectual property as well as non-legal concerns." At least two
authors have recommended that cross retaliation take the form of
either a government-issued compulsory licensing system for
suspension of copyrights with a focus on the entertainment
industry," or a compulsory licensing system for suspension of
13 See, e.g., Reese Ewing & Inae Riveras, Brazil to harden line on U.S. farm aid
post Doha, REUTERS, Jul. 30, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN3047082320080730.
14 See Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., WTO Panel Allows Brazil to
Cross-Retaliate on IP, Services in US Cotton Row, BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG.
(Sept. 9, 2009), http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly 1 3-30.pdf.
15 EC-Bananas III, supra note 9, 159-64.
16 See, e.g., Gabriel L. Slater, The Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations
Under Trips: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the
World Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 1365 (2009).
17 See id. at 1395-1409; see also Frederick M. Abbott, Cross-Retaliation in
TRIPS: Options for Developing Countries, ICTSD DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL
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patents with a focus on pharmaceutical drugs.'" Under such a
system, the government would issue revocable licenses to
businesses for the right to reproduce otherwise protected
materials. 1
In light of the DSB's recent decision to grant Brazil the right
of cross retaliation against the United States, this Comment will
consider the relative value of three policy options: suspension of
copyrights, suspension of patents, and settlement. Specifically,
this Comment will evaluate these policy options along three
dimensions that are critical for Brazil's success. First, the remedy
must validate Brazil's rights, either by inducing the United States
to comply or providing adequate remuneration for the violation.
Second, the remedy must address practical constraints, such as
concurrent legal obligations and political viability. Third, the
remedy must improve Brazil's social welfare.
This Comment proposes that Brazil's best policy option is
either to suspend patent obligations or to negotiate a settlement. If
Brazil were to suspend patent obligations, it could take advantage
of technology, such as pharmaceutical drugs, which has a great
potential to improve social welfare. Settlement, on the other hand,
may give Brazil leverage to influence and reform U.S. agricultural
policies with respect to cotton or other goods, a feat that no
developing country has been able to accomplish. In June 2010,
the United States and Brazil agreed to begin two years of
negotiations toward a settlement.2 0 If these negotiations are
successful, the Unites States will incorporate policies favorable to
Brazil in its next Farm Bill, an omnibus bill outlining the form and
substance of federal assistance to American farmers, which will go
into effect in 2012.21 If the negotiations fail, Brazil has indicated it
will pursue other means of retaliation. 22
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, (Int'l Ctr. For Trade and Sustainable Dev. 2009)
Apr. 2009, at 22-25 (explaining the various ways to suspend copyright protection,
including suspending the right to broadcast films on television or in public theaters).
18 See Slater, supra note 16, at 1389-95; Abbott, supra note 17, at 25-27.
19 See Slater, supra note 16, at 1396-9.
20 Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Brazil, US Strike 'Framework' Deal
in Cotton Dispute, BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG. (June 23, 2010),
http://ictsd.org/i/trade-and-sustainable-development-agenda/73938/.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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This Comment proceeds in six parts. Part II provides
background information on the WTO's dispute settlement process,
the economic policies supporting cross retaliation, and the three
cases in which the DSB authorized this remedy. Part III identifies
issues with suspending intellectual property rights, including
concurrent legal obligations, the political environment, and
implementation. Part IV provides analysis, exploring the three
policy options and measurement criteria in greater detail. Part V
identifies factors specific to the case of Brazil, and Part VI
concludes with recommendations for Brazil's best policy options.
Part II. Background
A. Dispute Settlement
i. History of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism at the
WTO
The WTO was preceded by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), a treaty signed in 1947 to reduce trade barriers
in the post-World War II world.23 The global trade infrastructure
encompassed in the GATT 1947 only covered trade in goods.24
Through several rounds of negotiations, culminating in the eighth
"Uruguay Round,"-which lasted from 1986 to 1994-the parties
to the GATT 1947 expanded the scope of trade regulation by
adding the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS). 25 The GATS regulates international trade in
services, including the cross-border supply of workers,2 6 and the
TRIPS agreement provides protection for intellectual property
rights (IPRs), including trademarks, copyrights, and patents.2 7
During the Uruguay Round, parties also created the WTO, an
international organization where countries could conduct future
23 This version of the GATT is known as "GATT 1947." The latest version is
known as "GATT 1994." See Understanding the WTO, INFO. AND MEDIA RELATIONS
Div., WORLD TRADE ORG., 15 (4th ed. 2008), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/understanding text e.pdf.
24 Id. at 24.
25 Id. at 23.
26 Id. at 34.
27 Id. at 39.
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trade negotiations.2 8 One of the WTO's innovations was the DSB,
a forum for member states to adjudicate disputes over trade
violations.2 9 If the DSB determines that a violation has occurred,
the violating country must bring its trade policy into compliance
with the ruling.30 The primary goal of the dispute settlement
process is to induce compliance with the GATT 1994, GATS, and
TRIPS agreements."
ii. Rules Allowing Cross Retaliation
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is a body of
procedural rules for dispute resolution at the DSB and was created
during the Uruguay Round of negotiations.3 2 Article 22 of the
DSU governs the scope of retaliation when a country does not
comply with a DSB ruling.3 3 Retaliation induces compliance,
provides reparations to the complaining country, and helps the
countries reach an equilibrium point on their balance of
concessions.34 As a general rule, a complaining country must first
try to retaliate in the same sector and under the same agreement
that the violation occurred.3 ' For example, a country whose cotton
industry has been injured must first seek to retaliate against the
violating country's cotton industry.
If "it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions" in
the same sector, the country should next seek to retaliate in a
different sector under the same agreement. 6 Following the same
example, the country whose cotton industry has been injured must
then try to retaliate against another goods-producing industry in
the violating country, since the GATT 1994 governs cotton.37
28 Understanding the WTO, supra note 23, at 10.
29 Id. at 55.
30 Id. at 58.
31 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, art. 21, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
32 See id.
33 Id. art. 22.2.
34 Slater, supra note 16, at 1371; see also Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade
Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 822 (2001).
35 DSU, supra note 31, arL22.3(a).
36 Id. art. 22.3(b).
37 See GATT 1994, supra note 5.
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Finally, a country may suspend obligations under a different
agreement "if that party considers that it is not practicable or
effective to suspend concessions . .. with respect to other sectors
under the same agreement."" For example, a country suffering a
violation under the GATT 1994 could retaliate under either the
GATS or TRIPS agreements. This third option, called "cross
retaliation," has only been allowed in three cases to date.3 9 Cross
retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement would permit a country to
suspend certain intellectual property rights of a country that had
violated the former country's rights under the GATT 1994.
iii. Economic Policies Supporting Cross Retaliation
Under the TRIPS Agreement
Two economic goals support a policy of cross retaliation under
the TRIPS agreement. First, cross retaliation can provide
meaningful economic benefits to a small developing country in the
context of an imbalance of trade flows.4 0 If the two parties to a
dispute have economies of vastly different sizes, the smaller of the
two may be unable to compel the larger, more developed country
to comply.4 1 Given this reality, the developing country's efforts to
restrict market access of a developed country may not have any
appreciable effect.42 Without providing the smaller economy with
a policy instrument-such as cross retaliation-to help level the
playing field, the larger economy would face no real consequences
for trade practices that violate international law.43
Second, a complaining party may suffer economically if it
38 Id. art. 22.3(c).
39 See infra Part II.B.
40 Abbott, supra note 17, at 9; see also Slater, supra note 16, at 1374.
41 This may not always be the case. Some developing countries, such as China,
India, or Brazil, may have large enough domestic markets to affect the economy of a
developed country. However, the "imbalance in the compliance-enforcement capacity of
developed and developing countries" is a common critique of the WTO dispute
settlement system. Abbott, supra note 17, at 9.
42 Id.
43 One author suggests an indicator of the power of cross retaliation under the
TRIPS agreement to create political pressure on the receiving country is the "hyperbolic
language" used when the possibility of TRIPS retaliation is raised. Constituents refer to
members threatening suspension as "pirates" and argue that suspension will lead to a
reduction in direct foreign investment. The author notes that these threats are not made
when a WTO member threatens to suspend concessions on goods. Id. at 9-10.
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raises tariffs on goods and services. If the complaining party
raises tariffs on goods, those tariffs may be passed along to the
consumer as higher prices." The problem is exacerbated when the
complaining country issues tariffs on goods from a large market,
such as the United States or European Union (EU), because goods
from those markets may represent a significant proportion of the
country's imports.
In the case of services, new restrictions may interrupt
beneficial relationships between local citizens and foreign service
providers, such as banks. If the complaining party restricts the
market access of foreign-service providers, domestic consumers
will need to find new providers, incurring lost time and transaction
costs. 45
On the other hand, a suspension of TRIPS obligations might be
economically beneficial for domestic consumers. Suspension of
intellectual property rights could give a complaining country's
domestic consumers access to entertainment products and new
technologies at a lower price.46
B. Cases Allowing Cross Retaliation Under the TRIPS
Agreement
i. EC-Bananas III
The first case authorizing cross retaliation under the TRIPS
agreement involved a claim by Ecuador against the EC for its
trade policies on bananas. 47  Ecuador claimed that the EC's
practice of granting preferences to its former colonies (known as
the African, Caribbean, and Pacific, or ACP states) was
discriminatory and violated international trade law. Ecuador and
other parties-the plaintiffs--did not qualify for these preferential
trade options and requested consultations with the EC regarding
the "importation, sale, and distribution of bananas."48 A DSB
44 Slater, supra note 16, at 1374-75.
45 Id.
46 See id.; see also Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve as
an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 403,
405 (2000).
47 Request for Consultations by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the
United States, EC-Bananas III, WT/DS27/1 (Feb. 12, 1996).
48 Id.
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panel, affirmed by the Appellate Body, determined in 1997 that
the EC had violated provisions of the GATT 1994.49
However, the EC remained out of compliance following the
ruling, and Ecuador subsequently requested that a DSB
compliance panel suspend concessions under the TRIPS
agreement instead of under the GATT 1994.so The panel
determined that the EC was not in compliance with the GATT
1994 and that sanctions were appropriate."
The case was then brought before a DSB arbitration panel to
rule on appropriate trade sanctions. The arbitrators determined
that Ecuador had met the necessary criteria under DSU Article
22.3-the provision authorizing cross retaliation- "to suspend
concessions or other obligations under another covered
agreement."5 2 Since the banana industry was a significant part of
Ecuador's economy, the arbitrators ruled that it had suffered a
"serious enough" injury to warrant suspension of rights under the
TRIPS agreement."
The arbitration panel cited development policy concerns to
support the decision. The panel noted that the objective of cross
retaliation in TRIPS was to induce compliance, and that inducing
compliance could be difficult where there is a large trade
imbalance between parties.54 The arbitrators were persuaded that
49 For a description of how a WTO case is brought, see Understanding the WTO,
supra note 23, at 55-61. The panel report was circulated on May 22, 1997. Report of the
Panel Report, EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/RIECU (May 22, 1997). The Appellate
Body Report was circulated on Sept. 9, 1997. Appellate Body Report, EC - Bananas III,
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
50 An Article 21.5 panel makes a determination of whether a party is in compliance
with a previous ruling. Article 21.5 of the DSU reads, in relevant part: "Where there is
disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures
taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided
through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible
resort to the original panel." DSU, supra note 31, art. 21.5.
51 The Article 21.5 panel report was circulated Apr. 12, 1999. Report of the Article
21.5 Panel, EC- Bananas III, WT/DS27/RW/ECU (Apr. 12, 1999).
52 EC-Bananas III, supra note 9, 1 44.
53 See id. T 129, 131 (noting that "Ecuador is the largest exporter of bananas in the
world and the largest exporter to the European market"); see also Abbott, supra note 17,
at 5-6.
54 The arbitrators noted: "in situations where the complaining party is highly
dependent on imports from the other party, it may happen that the suspension of certain
concessions or certain other obligations entails more harmful effects for the party
[Vol. XXXVI196
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inequality between Ecuador and the EC was "serious enough to
justify suspension across agreements."
Although noting that it had no obligation to direct Ecuador on
how to implement cross retaliation, the arbitration panel evaluated
Ecuador's proposal, since this was the first time the remedy had
been allowed.56 The arbitrators commended Ecuador for
proposing to suspend concessions pursuant to a government-issued
compulsory licensing system.5 7 Under this system, Ecuador would
grant licenses to individuals or organizations to reproduce material
that would otherwise be subject to copyright, geographical
indication, or industrial design protection." Ecuador would "limit
the suspension of concessions in terms of quantity, value and
time," and reserve the right to revoke the license at any time.5 9
The arbitrators praised this scheme because it addressed many of
the panel's concerns about managing cross retaliation.6 0
The arbitrators warned that a party should take special caution
to suspend only the IPRs of nationals of the WTO member in
violation." Furthermore, the arbitrators noted that a regime of IPR
suspension might create problems within the suspending country's
domestic legislation.62 If a suspending country had statutes
protecting intellectual property rights, suspension of these rights
may give rise to an independent cause of action based on domestic
law. 63
seeking suspension than for the other party." Decision by the Arbitrators, EC-Bananas
III, supra note 9, 73.
55 The arbitrators noted: "Ecuador's share of world merchandise trade is below 0.1
per cent, whereas the EC's world merchandise trade share is in the area of 20 per cent."
Id. 1 125. These statistics convinced the arbitrators that "these differences confirm our
considerations above that it may not be practicable or effective for Ecuador to suspend
concessions" under the GATT 1994 or GATS. Id. 126.
56 Id. 139.
57 Id. 159-64.
58 Id.
59 Decision by the Arbitrators, EC-Bananas III, supra note 9, 161.
60 Id. 164.
61 Id. 141.
62 Id. 1 158 ("We are aware that the implementation of the suspension of certain
TRIPS obligations may give rise to legal difficulties or conflicts within the domestic
legal system of the Member so authorized (and perhaps even of the Member(s) affected
by such suspension)").
63 Id.
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Finally, the arbitrators advised Ecuador that suspension of
IPRs in its territory would not affect the intellectual property rights
active in other countries.6 4 Therefore, Ecuador should "suspend
the intellectual property rights in question only for the purposes of
supply destined for the domestic market."65  However, the
arbitrators opted not to discuss how a regime suspending IPRs
would affect member parties' obligations under the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) agreements-the Berne
and Paris Conventions-which provide a separate basis for
international protection of copyrights and patents.
Ecuador never exercised its right to suspend intellectual
property protection, but instead negotiated a settlement with the
EC for improved market access for its bananas.67  The case was
informative because it noted the development policy implications
for cross retaliation and provided guidance for a working
suspension model, particularly the preference for a government-
issued compulsory licensing system. The case also demonstrated
the power of cross retaliation as leverage in future trade
negotiations.
ii. United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services
The second case to grant the right of cross retaliation involved
a dispute between Antigua and the United States. Antigua
successfully challenged U.S. laws prohibiting online gambling,
64 Decision by the Arbitrators, EC-Bananas III, supra note 9, 1 156 ("An
authorization of a suspension requested by Ecuador does of course not entitle other WTO
Members to derogate from any of their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.
Consequently, such DSB authorization to Ecuador cannot be construed by other WTO
Members to reduce their obligations under Part III of the TRIPS Agreement in regard to
imports entering their customs territories").
65 Id.
66 Id. T 152. These agreements are discussed infra at Part III.A.i.
67 See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/58
(July 2, 2001). Although a settlement agreement was negotiated in 2001, the dispute was
not completely resolved until 2009. Darren Ennis, EU Ends Banana War With Latin
America, Dec. 14, 2009, available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5BD3JI20091214.
68 The policy implications of such a licensing system are discussed infra at Part
IV.B.i.
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governed by the GATS.6'9 After reaching the Article 22.6
arbitration phase,70 Antigua requested the right to cross retaliate
under the TRIPS agreement, arguing that retaliation under the
GATS was not feasible because 1) the size of its economy relative
to the United States was not large enough to make a noticeable
impact, and 2) a suspension in services would cause severe
problems for Antiguan workers."
The arbitrators accepted these arguments, noting that "the
extremely unbalanced nature of the trading relations between the
parties makes it all the more difficult for Antigua to find a way of
ensuring the effectiveness of a suspension of concessions or other
obligations against the United States under the same agreement." 7 2
Thus, the arbitrators once again offered the right of cross
retaliation as a way to promote the development of a developing
country complainant and offer that party a policy tool to help level
the playing field.
Antigua stated which TRIPS agreement provisions it would
seek to suspend-trademarks, industrial designs, patents, and
undisclosed information-but it did not specify how it planned to
implement a suspension regime." The United States argued that
Antigua's failure to describe how it would cross retaliate could
"encourage rampant and uncontrolled IPR piracy." 74  The
arbitrators ruled that it was not necessary for Antigua to draw up a
69 Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States - Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/1
(Mar. 27, 2003).
70 The procedural history of this case is similar, albeit less complicated, than EC -
Bananas III, so it is not included here. For a description of the procedural history of this
case, see World Trade Org., United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/cases e/ds285 e.htm (last visited Oct. 28,
2010).
71 Decision by the Arbitrators, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services. Recourse to Arbitration by the United
States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, 4.109-4.110, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007).
72 Id. $ 4.114 (noting "that the heavy reliance of Antigua's economy on the very
sectors that would be candidates for retaliation under the GATS increases the likelihood
that an adverse impact would arise for Antigua itself, including for low-wage workers").
73 See Abbott, supra note 17, at 8.
74 Decision by the Arbitrators, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 71, 1 5.3.
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specific implementation plan at that time, only noting the
importance of devising a suspension plan that was equitable and
enforceable."
As of this writing, Antigua has not requested authorization
from the DSB to suspend IPRs, and has not reached a settlement
with the United States. 6
iii. United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton
In 2002, Brazil requested consultations at the DSB to
challenge the United States' subsidies for agricultural production
of upland cotton, the most commonly planted cotton species in the
United States.7  Brazil charged that these subsidies, which
included export credit guarantees and marketing loan payments,
violated U.S. international trade obligations." Export credit
guarantees provide export credit insurance "for exporters to
protect against commercial and political risks" of international
sales.79 Marketing loan payments provide farmers with subsidies
and short-term financing when crop prices are low. 0 Brazil
brought the challenge under provisions of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement),"' the
Agreement on Agriculture,82 and the GATT 1994.
75 Id. % 5.7-5.10.
76 See World Trade Org., United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 70.
77 Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
1, WT/DS267/1 (Oct. 3, 2002).
78 Id.
79 DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 76 (5th ed. 2002).
80 U.S. Office of Management and Budget and Federal Agencies, Agricultural
Marketing Loan Payments,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/summary/10001002.2007.html (last visited
Oct. 28, 2010).
81 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, THE LEGAL TEXTS:
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 275
(1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14.
82 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL
TEXTS 39 (1999), reprinted in 33 ILM 1167 (1994).
83 Id.
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A DSB panel ruled in favor of Brazil in September 2004.84
This result was upheld by the Appellate Body, which found that
several U.S. subsidy programs-including export credit guarantees
and marketing loan payments-violated WTO rules." The
Appellate Body ruled that the United States must remove the
prohibited subsidies by July 1, 2005. The Appellate Body also
noted that other U.S. programs were actionable subsidies-they
did not constitute per se violations, but caused "serious prejudice"
to Brazil's cotton industry between 1999 and 2002." The
Appellate Body gave the United States until September 21, 2005
to remove the remaining subsidies."
The United States missed the 2005 deadlines to remove the
illegal subsidies. In 2006, Congress repealed the "Step 2"
marketing loan program, but left the other subsidies, including the
export credit guarantees, in place.8 9 The United States and Brazil
agreed that they would pursue arbitration" to suspend trade
concessions, but only after 1) a compliance panel ruled against the
United States, and 2) Brazil requested the arbitration to resume.
Alleging a failure by the United States to implement the DSB's
findings, Brazil requested a compliance panel to determine if it
could levy sanctions against the United States.92
With a favorable compliance ruling, Brazil requested the
arbitration to continue. The arbitration panel issued a ruling on
84 See Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, supra note 2.
85 Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 496,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005).
86 Id. T 5.
87 Id. 472-73.
88 See World Trade Org., United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, supra note
3.
89 See Bradley S. Klapper, WTO Sanctions U.S. Over Cotton Subsidies, WASH.
POST, Sept. 1, 2009, at A9 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/3 1/AR2009083103679.html.
90 DSU, supra note 31, art. 22.6.
91 Karen Halverson Cross, International Decisions: United States-Subsidies on
Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, 103 AM. J. INT'L. L. 110,
113 (2009).
92 Article 21.5 Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/RW/Corr.l (Dec. 18, 2007). The Appellate Body upheld the decision of the
compliance panel. Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on
Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008).
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August 31, 2009.' The ruling allowed Brazil to impose at least
$294.7 million in trade sanctions94 on the United States and
possibly suspend intellectual property rights protected by the
TRIPS agreement. 95 If sanctions rise above a threshold, then
Brazil would be allowed to cross retaliate "with respect to any
amount of permissible countermeasures applied in excess of [the
threshold]."96 Otherwise, "Brazil would be entitled to suspend
concessions or other obligations only in trade in goods."9 7
The latest estimate suggests that Brazil is interested in
settlement but remains poised to set over $800 million in sanctions
on U.S. goods and intellectual property rights if negotiations fail.
Since Brazil is the biggest and most powerful economy to be
awarded the right of cross retaliation, it is more likely than past
parties to use the remedy if necessary. As of Summer 2010,
officials in Brazil and the United States began a series of
negotiations, which if successful, will produce favorable results
for Brazil.99 In the meantime, the United States has agreed to
grant Brazil $147 million per year in technical assistance and
promises to change its export credit program, which benefits
purchasers of U.S. cotton.100
Part III. Legal, Political, and Practical Issues with
Suspending IPRs
Ecuador, Antigua, and Brazil have opened the door for
developing countries to cross retaliate against their trading
partners under the TRIPS Agreement. None of these countries
have implemented a suspension scheme, but several authors have
noted potential barriers to cross retaliation and proposed
frameworks for implementation, as discussed in Part C of this
section.
93 Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, supra note 1.
94 Id.T5.101.
95 Id. 5.230.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG., supra note 20.
99 Id.
100 Id.
[Vol. XXXVI202
2010] CROss RETALIATION UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
As the panel in EC-Bananas III pointed out, TRIPS is not the
final word on cross retaliation.' 1 Countries that win the right to
cross retaliate under the TRIPS Agreement might face other
hurdles from concurrent treaty obligations and domestic law.10 2
Countries will also face social challenges, including political
pressure from stakeholders, questions of implementation, and
dilemmas about how to best improve social welfare. 0 3 This
section will analyze these issues, with a particular focus on the
social challenges.
A. Legal Issues
i. Treaties
The TRIPS agreement is not intended to override members'
obligations under other treaties.'0 4 Intellectual property rights are
also protected under treaties governed by the WIPO, most notably
the Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works' and the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial
Property.'06 The Berne Convention, which has been in effect for
almost 125 years, protects the copyrights of artists
internationally,0 7 while the Paris Convention, which has been in
effect since the 1880s, provides international protection for patent
rights. 0 8  TRIPS incorporates by reference the substantive
lot See Decision by the Arbitrators, EC- Bananas III, supra note 9, % 159-64.
102 See, e.g., Slater, supra note 16, at 1375.
103 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 17, at 13.
104 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.2 ("Nothing in Parts I to IV of this
Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each
other under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits").
105 Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as revised at Paris on July
24, 1971 and amended in 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
106 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as last revised at the Stockholm Revision
Conference) [hereinafter Paris Convention].
107 See Berne Convention, supra note 105. As of this writing, the Berne Convention
has 164 members, including virtually all members of the WTO. World Intell. Prop. Org.
(WIPO), Contracting Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/ (last visited Oct.
28, 2009) (follow "Contracting Parties" hyperlink).
108 See Paris Convention, supra note 106, art. 1-12, 19.
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protection that the Paris and Berne Conventions provide.o
Although no judicial body has ruled on the legal relationship
of the incorporated provisions of the Berne and Paris Conventions
with the TRIPS Agreement, several scholars have opined that the
WIPO conventions will not likely present a barrier to suspending
IPRs under the TRIPS agreement.110 Furthermore, a party subject
to IPR suspension under the TRIPS agreement probably could not
bring a separate claim for a violation of the Berne or Paris
Convention at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is the
forum for adjudicating such disputes. This is likely because nearly
all signatories to those treaties are also obligated under the WTO's
DSU. The ICJ would be expected to find "that the complaining
and responding states had each expressly accepted the suspension
regime prescribed by WTO DSU rules" providing for cross
retaliation."' Therefore, it is unlikely that the ICJ would find a
violation of either treaty.1 2 Instead, the court would probably find
that the parties had expressly accepted the WTO obligations upon
becoming WTO members.
Two other treaties, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)"' and
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)"l also
provide international protection for intellectual property rights.
These treaties were adopted after TRIPS and thus are not
incorporated by reference. However, both treaties allow for
109 Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention and articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris
Convention are incorporated by reference in TRIPS. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8,
art. 2.1, 9.1.
110 A former WTO Legal Affairs Officer notes that "[a]ny rights or obligations that
WTO members may obtain under Parts V to VII do not necessarily have to give way to
WIPO conventions, at least not pursuant to Art. 2.2." He further explains that, pursuant
to the Vienna convention on the law of treaties, "because there is no inherent hierarchy
between the sources of international law ... the latest expression of state intent, in casu,
the DSB authorisation [to suspend TRIPS obligations], must prevail." JOOST PAUWELYN,
CONFLICT OF NoRMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES To
OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 346 (2003). See also Slater, supra note 16, at
1376-77; Abbott, supra note 17, at 13-14.
111 Abbott, supra note 17, at 14.
112 Id.
113 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WCT].
14 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76
[hereinafter WPPT].
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deviations from the protected IPRs under some circumstances."'
Therefore, a party could most likely suspend IPRs under the
TRIPS agreement and not be in violation of those treaties.
Some bilateral treaties may also provide a framework for the
treatment of intellectual property rights between the signatory
states. Most notably, the United States has initiated some free
trade agreements with developing countries that provide stronger
intellectual property protections than are recognized by the TRIPS
agreement."' These provisions, known as "TRIPS-plus," were
intended to enhance the scope of intellectual property protections
between the parties.'" As a result, TRIPS-plus provisions may
present barriers for countries that are subject to such
agreements."' These provisions may effectively supersede the
TRIPS Agreement by providing stronger protections for
intellectual property rights or may disallow cross retaliation as a
remedy for non-compliance. Therefore, countries that enter into
TRIPS-plus agreements with a trading partner may be unable to
use cross retaliation as a remedy against that country.
ii. Domestic Legal Issues
Treaties are not the only source of legal issues regarding the
suspension of TRIPS obligations. Countries may have codified
their TRIPS obligations in domestic statutes or have other
intellectual property legislation that would prohibit suspending
these rights. These countries would need to amend their statutes in
order to suspend the TRIPS obligations. The situation is further
115 WCT article 10 provides: "Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation,
provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and
artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author." WCT, supra note 113, art. 10.1. WPPT article 16.1 provides the same
exceptions. WPPT, supra note 114, art. 16.1.
116 See, e.g., The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement, chapter 15, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/fmal-text [hereinafter DR-
CAFTA].
117 Abbott, supra note 17, at 16.
118 For an in depth discussion of TRIPS-plus provisions, see id. at 16-18. See also
PEDRO ROFFE, BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE CHILE-USA
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Geoff Tansey, ed., Int'l Ctr. For Trade and Sustainable Dev.,
2004).
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complicated if the national constitution protects intellectual
property rights." 9 One solution is for a country to amend the
statute to allow the government to suspend certain provisions
under circumstances where cross retaliation is permitted. 12 0 This
modification should be feasible because TRIPS and other WTO
agreements do not prohibit countries from amending domestic
legislation. 121
B. Political Environment
Even if a complaining country can overcome the legal
challenges of suspending TRIPS obligations, it will likely face an
onslaught of political pressure from the affected government and
other stakeholders. A stakeholder may characterize the right to
suspend intellectual property protection as illegal by using terms
like "piracy."l 22  The legal term "piracy" refers to the
"unauthorized and illegal reproduction or distribution of materials
protected by copyright, patent, or trademark law."' 2 3 It is used
colloquially to refer to the stealing of copyrighted music and other
media, usually from the Internet. 124 By equating cross retaliation
with piracy, the stakeholder creates a public relations problem for
the government that holds the right.
For example, Antigua faced such challenges in 2007 when the
WTO authorized the tiny island nation to suspend TRIPS
obligations. Immediately following the ruling, the Office of the
United States Trade Representative-the top U.S. trade
negotiator-issued a statement warning that "it would establish a
harmful precedent for a WTO Member to affirmatively authorize
what would otherwise be considered acts of piracy, counterfeiting,
or other forms of IPR infringement."1 25
119 See, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL'Y, Strengthening Compliance at the WTO:
Cross-retaliation in WTO disputes (Ben Lilliston ed., Sept. 2006), available at
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/index.cfm?refid=89107.
120 See id. at 2.
121 Subramanian & Watal, supra note 46, at 415.
122 See Abbott, supra note 17, at 1.
123 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1186 (8th ed. 2004).
124 See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 943 (11th ed. 2005).
125 Press Release, Off. U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on Internet Gambling
(Dec. 21, 2007),
http://ustraderep.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press Releases/2007/December/Statementon_
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Such political pressure was intended to draw attention to
Antigua's use of this remedy. Brendan McGivern, a trade lawyer
based in Geneva, described the U.S. tactics: "[e]ven if Antigua
goes ahead with an act of piracy or the refusal to allow the
registration of a trademark, the question still remains of how much
that act is worth ... .[T]he U.S. is going to dog them on every step
of the way."' 26 Thus, Antigua can expect the United States to use
all political channels to push for a beneficial resolution of the case.
C. Implementation
Even if a country can create a legal context for suspension of
TRIPS obligations and surmount the political pressure to not do
so, the country may face significant challenges of implementation.
These problems are likely to be twofold. First, the country must
have infrastructure in place to take advantage of the suspended
rights.'2 7 Second, the country must be able to monitor the use of
material produced under the suspension scheme."2
The infrastructure problem will be most pronounced with the
reproduction of technology normally subject to patents.12 9 This is
particularly true for infrastructure for pharmaceutical production.
Although developing countries could see large improvements in
social welfare because of greater access to medicines, 30 these
countries will be unable to take advantage of the access to generic
drugs if they do not have the capacity to produce them at home.'3 '
InternetGambling.html.
126 James Kanter & Gary Rivlin, Ruling Lets Antigua Be Pirate To Punish U.S. in
Trade Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007, at C3.
127 See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round's Public
Health Legacy: Strategies for, the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines
Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 921, 927-28 (2007)
(contending that infrastructure and financial means are essential to a developing
country's ability to manufacture generic medicines).
128 See Slater, supra note 16, at 1401 (suggesting that a government-issued
compulsory licensing system is best because it would help retaliating countries monitor
the total value of licenses distributed).
129 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 127, at 927 (arguing that inadequate
technology infrastructure contributes to least-developed countries' limited access to
medicines).
130 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 127.
131 However, a growing number of "middle-income" countries, such as Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, India, Thailand, Egypt, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea, have the
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The monitoring problem is most likely to arise in the area of
copyrighted material. Since many copyrighted works, including
music, are available in a digital format, they are easy to transfer
from one person to another. While this quality reduces the need
for infrastructure, it means the material easily can be reproduced
illegally.
To illustrate the extent of this problem, Antigua has already
had difficulties monitoring distribution of copyrighted material
subject to its 2007 ruling against the United States, even though
Antigua has not yet developed a suspension regime. In Antigua, a
company called Zookz launched a website offering unlimited
entertainment downloads for a small monthly fee.'32 The
company's operators claimed to be working under the 2007 WTO
decision.133  The government of Antigua issued a statement
clarifying that "[t]he operators of Zookz.com have not played any
role in the Antiguan gaming industry or in our country's case
pending before the WTO," and that "Antigua and Barbuda has not
authorized any person or entity to implement sanctions."l3 4 The
Zookz website is no longer operating, suggesting that it has been
shut down by the government of Antigua."' Nevertheless, the case
illustrates the problems that governments can face with monitoring
the use of copyrighted materials.
Part IV. Measurement Criteria and Policy Options
Following Ecuador's proposed suspension system, several
authors have suggested that the best workable model for
suspending TRIPS obligations is for the government to issue
compulsory licenses for companies to reproduce material subject
to copyrights and patents.3 6 This section will describe how those
capacity to produce generic medicines at a low cost. Id. at 928.
132 Jon Healey, Op-Ed., Zookz: A License to Infringe? THE L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2009,
http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2009/07/zookz-antigua-wto.html.
133 Id.
134 Press Release, Gov'T OF ANT. & BARB, Statement on Unauthorized
Representations by Zookz.com Regarding its Ent. Download Website (July 17, 2009),
http://www.ab.gov.ag/gov v2/government/pressreleases/pressreleases2009/prelease_200
9July17_1.html.
135 Matt Rosoff, Plug pulled on unlimited-download site Zookz, CNET NEWS, July
20, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13526_3-10291414-27.html.
136 See, e.g., Slater, supra note 16, at 1386; Abbott, supra note 17, at 20-2 1.
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proposed models would operate and adds another option: the
possibility that a country will enter into a settlement agreement
with the violating country. These descriptions will then be applied
to measurement criteria to analyze how countries might proceed to
best meet their own goals.
A. Measurements
Any policy option must be analyzed in terms of criteria that
can accurately measure the strength of each option. This section
proposes a number of measurement criteria. Cross retaliation must
1) validate the complaining country's rights, 2) address practical
constraints, and 3) improve social welfare.
First, a viable policy option should validate the complaining
country's rights, ultimately inducing the violating country to
comply with the DSB ruling.13 7 However, if cross retaliation does
not bring the violating country into compliance, it should at least
ensure that the complaining country is adequately compensated for
the loss of its rights.' 8 The litigation will be meaningless if it does
not improve the position of the complaining country.
Second, a viable policy option should address the practical
constraints of suspending trade concessions.'3 9 The cross
retaliation scheme must meet the implementing country's legal
obligations, both nationally and internationally.'4 0 The scheme
should also minimize political problems.'4 ' The violating country
is likely to face political pressure from the government of the
complaining country as well as from its own stakeholder
constituents.142  Additionally, the complaining country must
137 Inducing compliance is a major policy goal of the WTO dispute settlement
process: "Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in
order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members." DSU,
supra note 31, art. 21.1.
138 Compensation is available as a remedy if the DSB's ruling is not implemented in
a "reasonable amount of time" by the violating country. However, "neither
compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full
implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the
covered agreements." Id. at 22. 1.
139 See Abbott, supra note 17, at 33.
140 See supra Part III. A.
141 See supra Part I. B.
142 See INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL'Y, supra note 119, at 2 (contending that
corporations that benefit from intellectual property protection will pressure violating
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implement the cross retaliation scheme to ensure effective control
over the material, preserving the ability to end the scheme once the
amount authorized for retaliation has been met.143
Third, a viable policy option should improve social welfare.
Since this policy option will most often be used by developing
countries against developed countries, cross retaliation offers a
unique opportunity for developing countries to improve the well-
being of their citizens.1" Social welfare can be considered in
terms of producers or consumers; the benefits of cross retaliation
can be measured by increased cash flows to producers or through
monetary savings to consumers.
B. Policy Options
i. Copyrights
Copyright suspension may become the predominant form of
cross retaliation because copyrighted materials are available in
digital format and are easy to reproduce.145 Countries would need
little infrastructure to take advantage of this option and would
have minimal financial loss if the operation needed to cease once
the violating country came into compliance.14 6
TRIPS provides copyright protection for "expressions,"l 47 and
requires all signatories to adhere to articles 1-21 of the Berne
Convention.'48 The Berne Convention establishes minimum
substantive rights for copyright holders, including the exclusive
right to: 1) reproduce literary and artistic works "in any form or
manner;" 2) authorize public performances; and 3) authorize
derivative works, such as adaptations.' 49 The Berne Convention
requires national treatment, which entitles foreign authors the
countries into compliance).
143 See supra Part Ill. C.
144 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 17, at 37.
145 Slater, supra note 16, at 1396.
146 Id.
147 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 9.2. TRIPS does not provide protection for
"ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts." Id.
148 Id. art. 9.1. However, TRIPS does not incorporate article 6bis of the Berne
Convention, which is the moral rights provision. See Id.
149 Berne Convention, supra note 105, art. 8, 11, 1 1bis, 12, 14, 14bis; accord. Slater,
supra note 16, at 1395.
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same treatment as national authors.15 0  Under the Berne
Convention, copyright attaches to an author's work without the
author having to register the work or follow any other formal
procedure.'
TRIPS protection extends beyond the Berne Convention in a
number of ways. TRIPS defines computer source and object
codes as "literary works,""5 2 whereas this protection was not
needed when the Berne Convention was first enacted in 1886.
TRIPS also provides more remedies for violations of intellectual
property rights, allowing for domestic enforcement mechanisms
and authorizing parties to bring disputes to the Dispute Settlement
Body. 1
Ecuador proposed a system of government-issued revocable
licenses to meet these criteria in EC-Bananas III. Under its plan,
Ecuador proposed suspending Article 14 of TRIPS, which protects
the "related rights" of copyright holders, including rights of
reproduction.1 4 Individuals or companies in Ecuador could apply
to the government for a permit to suspend Article 14 rights within
the country.' The license would be limited "in terms of quantity,
value and time," and the government could revoke the license at
any time.'56 Each reproduction would be assigned a "suspension
value" equal to the value of a new "commercially most interesting
sound recording" or other media.' 57 Since Ecuador demonstrated a
low probability that its plan would exceed the suspension level
allowed under the ruling, the arbitrators supported the proposal.'"
A system of government-issued licenses, like the one proposed by
Ecuador, might be viable in other countries as well.
A cross retaliation regime suspends copyrights rates favorably
under the first two measurement criteria, inducing compliance and
150 Berne Convention, supra note 105, art. 5.1.
151 Id. art. 5.2.
152 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 10.1.
153 Id. art. 41, 64.1. See GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. 22, 23.
154 EC - Bananas III, supra note 9, 1 161. Ecuador did not plan to suspend article
9, which incorporates the Berne Convention. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 9.
155 EC - Bananas II, supra note 9, T 161.
156 Id.
'57 Id.
158 Id.
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providing remuneration. The plan is likely to induce compliance
because the violating country will face political pressure to
comply with the ruling from its affected constituents.15 9
According to one author, the copyright/entertainment industry was
one of the biggest supporters of the TRIPS Agreement and one of
the biggest advocates for strong international protection of
intellectual property rights.160 This author notes that "[i]t is fair to
assume that retaliatory measures addressing [the
copyright/entertainment or pharmaceutical sector] will generate
political pressure within the affected country."1 6' This point was
illustrated in EC-Bananas III, where Ecuador's intent to
implement a copyright suspension scheme created enough political
pressure for the EC to make its banana trade policy more favorable
to Ecuador.162  If Ecuador is a representative example, other
countries will also likely be able to induce compliance by
implementing a copyright suspension scheme.
Depending on the size of the complaining country's economy,
cross retaliation on copyrights is also likely to provide adequate
remuneration by allowing the complaining country to avoid paying
royalties. Since this suspension system would primarily make
entertainment goods (e.g. movies, music, and books) available
without copyright restrictions, the success of the program depends
on domestic demand for such goods.66 Therefore, if domestic
demand is limited, this remedy may not produce the level of
remuneration that the complaining country had hoped. This may
be particularly true in very small countries or in least developed
countries (LDCs). As an illustration, this may be the case in
Antigua. One author suggested that "[i]t is doubtful that
suspending U.S. copyrights could increase domestic retail sales of
U.S. copyrighted goods in Antigua by $21 million annually,"
159 See Abbott, supra note 17, at 37.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 The EC agreed to treat Ecuadorian bananas the same as it treated bananas from
its former colonies, which had previously received preferential trading rights. See
Matthew S. Dunne III, Note, Redefining Power Orientation: A Reassessment of
Jackson's Paradigm in Light ofAsymmetries of Power, Negotiation, and Compliance in
the GAIT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 277, 307 (2002).
163 Normally, a country will not be able to export the copyright-free material
because other countries are still bound by the copyright laws. See Abbott, supra note 17.
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which is the amount by which it is allowed to retaliate.164 A
country like Antigua could combine a copyright suspension plan
with another form of cross retaliation, since copyright suspension
alone may not provide complete remuneration in a country with a
small domestic market.
Second, a country implementing a copyright suspension
regime may face practical restraints, in terms of legal
requirements, political problems, and control of the materials.
While many authors have suggested that a copyright suspension
system could be implemented in a way to avoid concurrent legal
problems,'6 5 no court has directly tested the validity of these
assertions.166 Nevertheless, various authors argue that the
requirements of the Berne Convention and other treaties could be
met by an implementing country, suggesting that a copyright
suspension scheme could meet all legal requirements.167
On the other hand, a copyright suspension regime is likely to
open the complaining country to criticisms of intellectual property
theft and "piracy." 68 Besides verbal attacks, the violating country
may use economic pressure to prevent the complaining country
from implementing the copyright suspension plan.169 For example,
many developed countries give tariff preferences to less developed
countries under voluntary schemes that can be unilaterally
withdrawn.'70  These benefits, such as the U.S. Generalized
164 The author noted "this would require average new expenditures of $300 per
person in a country with a GDP [purchasing power parity] per capita of $17,000." Isaac
Wohl, The Antigua-United States Online Gambling Dispute, 2 J. INT'L COM. EcoN. 127,
139(2009).
165 See supra Part III. A.
166 However, the arbitrators in EC - Bananas III indicated their support for a
government-issued compulsory licensing system, such as the one proposed by Ecuador:
"In our view, the mechanisms envisaged by Ecuador for implementing the suspension of
certain sections of the TRIPS Agreement, if authorized by the DSB, would take account
of many of our remarks made in the preceding sections." Decision by the Arbitrators,
EC-Bananas 111, supra note 9, j 164.
167 See, e.g., Slater, supra note 16, at 1375-76; Abbott, supra note 17, at 13.
168 For example, Antigua faced such criticisms after winning the right to cross
retaliate. See supra Part 1Il. B.
169 This is particularly true since the violating country is probably facing political
pressure and threats of litigation from its copyright/entertainment sector. See Abbott,
supra note 17, at 37.
170 See, e.g., Off. U.S. Trade Representative, Generalized System ofPreferences,
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System of Preferences, promote economic growth in developing
countries by allowing products to enter the U.S. market duty
free.'7 1  If the violating country has some flexibility to remove
tariff preferences or other economic assistance tools, it may use
this as leverage against the complaining country. 17 2
However, it is possible that political pressure from a copyright
suspension scheme would benefit the implementing country. If
the copyright/entertainment industry in the violating country has a
stronger voice than the industry of the original violation (i.e.
bananas in the EC or upland cotton in the United States), then the
copyright/entertainment industry can likely persuade the
government to comply with the WTO ruling. Compliance would
necessitate the end of copyright suspension, and the complaining
country would receive the benefit of winning its lawsuit.
As another practical consideration, a government-issued
compulsory license-based copyright suspension system will not
require new infrastructure. Individuals and firms will apply to the
government for a permit to reproduce copyrighted material, and
the government will issue the permits at its discretion. Since much
copyrighted material is already in a digital format, it will be easy
to reproduce. 7 1
Despite the benefits of copyright suspension, the system will
have problems of implementation and monitoring. To use Brazil
as an example, according to research by the International
Intellectual Property Alliance, nearly $1 billion U.S. worth of
copyrighted materials are traded illegally in Brazil each year.174 If
copyrights were suspended for a period of time, it might be
difficult for Brazil to monitor the levels of reproduction, given the
ttp://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized-
system-preference-gsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
171 Id.
172 For example, Brazil receives about $2.5 billion in trade benefits from the United
States under the Generalized System of Preferences. The United States has urged Brazil
to improve its protection of intellectual property rights in order to retain these benefits.
The United States has no legal obligation to continue to offer this support. INST. FOR
AGRIC. & TRADE POL'Y, supra note 119, at 2.
173 Slater, supra note 16, at 1396.
174 Int'l Intell. Prop. Alliance 2009, SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 156 (2009),
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2009/2009SPEC301BRAZIL.pdf.
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large domestic market for illegally downloaded material. A
compulsory licensing system may help prevent the problem by
allowing the government to control which producers have the right
to reproduce the materials. At the very least, the compulsory
licensing system would shift liability for the illegally reproduced
materials from the government to the private sector.
Third, a complaining country should consider the social
welfare implications of suspending copyright protections. If a
country were to implement a copyright suspension system, most of
the economic benefit of this plan would go to producers rather
than consumers.' While consumers would probably appreciate
the lower price of entertainment goods, these goods are non-
essential and widely available for free on the black market."'
Consumers, particularly in developing countries, might benefit
more from increased access to technology normally subject to
patents-especially pharmaceutical drugs and other technologies
that can improve the standard of living-rather than to
copyrighted material.
Producers, on the other hand, would benefit because the
copyright suspension system would eliminate major production
expenses. Producers might otherwise be required to pay royalties
to the rights owners that they would now not have to pay.177
Therefore, a copyright suspension could help a country develop
local businesses. Given the growth potential for producers and the
lower social welfare effect for consumers, a government needs to
consider its goals-including which parties will benefit-when
choosing which suspension system to implement. Nevertheless,
copyright suspension might become the principal form of cross
retaliation because it requires little initial investment from
producers and limited financial cost if the facilities need to be shut
175 Cf Abbott, supra note 17, at 37 ("A government may also improve social
welfare by making available entertainment-related products at lower cost through
copyright suspension. It is not unreasonable to suppose that such 'making available'
would be well received by people within the country, thus increasing support for
government policy").
176 See, e.g., Jenna Hentoff, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Works in the Digital
Age: Why the Current Process is Ineffective and How Congress is Attempting to Fix It, 8
J. HIGH TECH. L. 113, 126 (2008).
177 In the United States, for example, the current royalty rate per for music is 9.1
cents per song. Slater, supra note 16, at 1398.
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down.'
ii. Patents
TRIPS requires WTO members to provide patents for "any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology."' The patent confers on its holder the right to
prevent third parties from "making, using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing," a patented product or process. 80 The patent
must hold at least a twenty-year term.18'
TRIPS allows "limited exceptions to the exclusive rights" of
rights holders.182  Countries may adopt legislation "necessary to
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development."l 83  Countries may also adopt
measures "to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by
right holders," such as engaging in "practices which unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology."l 84
Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement allows countries to use
patented technology without the authorization of the right holder
"[i]n situations of national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency" after satisfying certain requirements.8
However, the rights holder is entitled to "adequate
remuneration."' 8  At least one author suggests that a compulsory
178 Id. at 1396, n. 183; Subramanian & Watal, supra note 46, at 413.
179 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27.1. This provision is subject to some
limitations. Members can exclude from patentability inventions for which commercial
exploitation is necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life, or to prevent
environmental degradation. Id. art. 27.2. Members can also exclude "diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods" and certain plants and animals. Id. art. 27.3. See
generally H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW 345, 351-
61 (1995) (outlining TRIPS provisions for patents).
180 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 28.1(a)-(b).
181 Id. art. 33.
182 Id. art. 30.
183 Id. art. 8.1.
184 Id. art. 8.2.
185 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3 1(b).
186 Id. art. 31(h).
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licensing system, like the one Ecuador proposed for copyrights,
would be viable upon suspending the "adequate remuneration of
article 31(h)."'
Since patent owners have to disclose their patents, countries
would often have enough information at their disposal to recreate
the technology.' However, patents are applied for and granted in
only a few countries on a regular basis, which would limit the type
of technology available to the country implementing a suspension
regime.' For example, if a violating country did not produce
many patents, the complaining country would have limited ability
to use this remedy. Nonetheless, a suspension system for patent
rights might be viable for some countries.
Many of the challenges to copyright suspension also apply to
patent suspension. However, patent suspension, particularly
pharmaceutical patents, could provide large benefits to the
complaining country's citizens by offering important technology
at a less prohibitive price.190 This analysis demonstrates that
suspending patent rights may be beneficial to the complaining
country if it can overcome some practical constraints.
A patent suspension system would satisfy the first criterion,
validating the rights of the complaining country. Such a system is
likely to induce compliance.' 9' Although no country has yet
proposed a patent suspension plan, an analogy can be drawn to
copyrights. Like in the copyright context, patent holders-
particularly the pharmaceutical industry-have strong political
influence.' 92 If, for example, a pharmaceutical company was
facing patent suspension in a large country like Brazil, it might be
able to influence the government to comply with the ruling and
avoid losing its intellectual property rights.
A patent suspension system would provide greater benefit to
the complaining country than copyright suspension because
otherwise patented technologies could be reproduced at a lower
cost. As one author notes, "[f]or many developing countries,
187 Slater, supra note 16, at 1391-94.
188 Abbott, supra note 17, at 25.
189 Id. at 26.
190 Id. at 37.
191 See id.
192 Id.
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access to patented pharmaceuticals is a top priority.""' Since
many of these countries cannot afford an adequate supply of
medicine, suspension of pharmaceutical patents would provide
two benefits: first, it would help countries get access to the amount
of medicine that they need; and second, it would make the
medicine more affordable.
A patent suspension plan will encounter significant problems
on the second criterion, practical feasibility. While such a plan
can probably overcome the legal barriers to implementation, it will
be unlikely to minimize political problems. The implementing
country's ability to ensure control over the material is better than
in the copyright context, but will still depend on the capacity of
the government in question.
Similar to the copyright context, international treaties-like the
Paris Convention will not likely prevent a complaining country
from suspending patents.19 4 However, the threat of suspension
may lead violating countries to create new legal barriers to cross
retaliation. The United States has already tried to improve
international IPR protection through some regional free trade
agreements that contain "TRIPS-plus" provisions.195 Since
agreements like the DR-CAFTA deliberately provide for more
intellectual property protection than the TRIPS agreement,
member countries would likely be precluded from cross retaliation
without violating their regional commitments.'96 While stepped-
up IPR protections would only apply to parties of a regional
agreement like DR-CAFTA, such protections may preclude using
the remedy against the United States, a major producer of patented
materials. It is possible that in the future, the United States would
seek to negotiate provisions of regional treaties that not only
include TRIPS-plus provisions, but explicitly prohibit cross
retaliation.
A patent suspension plan is unlikely to minimize political
problems for the implementing country. While the piracy rhetoric
might be less applicable in this setting since that is most often
193 Slater, supra note 16, at 1390.
194 Abbott, supra note 17, at 14.
195 Id. at 17. See, e.g., DR-CAFTA, supra note 116, at ch. 15.
196 For an in-depth discussion of the DR-CAFTA as it relates to cross retaliation, see
Abbott, supra note 17, at 16-18.
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associated with copyright theft,'9 the complaining country will
likely still face criticism that it is stealing another country's work
product. It may also risk losing voluntary benefits it receives from
the violating country, such as trade benefits provided under the
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences. In terms of rhetoric,
however, the complaining country will benefit from the political
pressure from the technology sector of the violating government.
The ability to ensure control over the patented materials will
vary from country to country. For many countries, the difficult
part will be infrastructure. Especially with high-tech patented
materials like pharmaceutical drugs, many countries will not have
the infrastructure already in place to reproduce the technology. If
a country decides to build the necessary infrastructure, it will be
left with unusable infrastructure after the suspension period is
over. It may be most practical for a country to choose to suspend
the patents on products that have only a short time left on their
required twenty-year patents.'98 Ideally, the country could suspend
the last few years of a patent and then continue to produce the
technology once the patent had expired.
While infrastructure might present a challenge, monitoring
should be much easier in the patent context than with copyrights.
Because specialized infrastructure will be necessary in many
cases, fewer producers will be able to take advantage of the
suspension. With fewer producers involved, it will be easier for
the government to monitor the levels of suspension and ensure that
the technology is not reproduced illegally.
The potential for patent suspension to meet the third criterion,
improving social welfare, is tremendous.1 99 In light of the social
benefits of increased access to technology, TRIPS has already
established several protections for less developed countries.
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement provides guidelines for
countries that use patented technologies without consent of the
rights holder.2 00 TRIPS foresees the possibility that a country
197 See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 124.
198 See Slater, supra note 16, at 1389-90.
199 See Abbott, supra note 17, at 37.
200 This use, however, must be subject to the laws of the Member state. TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31.
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would use patented technology under emergency circumstances.201
For example, Brazil and Thailand have both used the Article 31
framework to use patented pharmaceutical drugs.202 Mozambique,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe-which are considered LDCs-have also
issued compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS anti-retroviral
medicines and plan to produce the medicines domestically.20 3
Given the attention TRIPS has focused on making patented
technologies available to developing countries, such technologies
may have a great potential to improve social welfare.
iii. Settlement
In some instances, the right to suspend TRIPS obligations will
provide a great enough threat that the complaining country will be
able to negotiate a settlement with the violating country.2 ' In EC-
Bananas III, the threat of suspension served two functions,
ultimately leading to settlement. 205  First, in October 2000,
Ecuador's threat of suspension caused the EC to end the
discriminatory treatment of Ecuadorian bananas.206 Second, the
threat empowered Ecuador to oppose a similar settlement
201 Article 31, subsection (g) provides that "authorization for such use shall be
liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so
authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist
and are unlikely to recur." This suggests that under some circumstances, a government
could use patented technology to improve public welfare. TRIPS Agreement, supra note
8, art. 31(g).
202 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 127, at 949-53 (describing Brazil's
commitment to ensuring access to medications and Thailand's commitment to providing
treatment for HIV/AIDS). See infra Part V (discussion of Brazil's campaign for access
to medicine).
203 Slater, supra note 16, at 1391-92.
204 Ecuador entered into a settlement with the EC in 2001. Notification of Mutually
Agreed Solution, supra note 67. Antigua has not yet settled with the United States, but it
appears that a settlement will be the ultimate resolution. See World Trade Org., United
States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, supra note 70.
205 Dunne, supra note 162, at 307.
206 The EC ended its preferential treatment of bananas from the African, Caribbean,
and Pacific (ACP) group of states, which provided better trade terms for former
European colonies, which did not include Ecuador. See id, see also Joe Kirwin, EU
Foreign Ministers Give Qualified Backing to Transitional Banana Tariff-Quota
Proposal, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1540, 1540 (Oct. 12, 2000).
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agreement the EC made with the United States in April 2001.207
A settlement will have a mixed result for the first criterion,
upholding the country's rights. It may not induce compliance, but
it is likely to provide remuneration for the complaining country.
The likelihood of inducing compliance will depend on how the
complaining country uses cross retaliation as leverage. Some
small countries, such as Antigua, may seek settlement because
they do not have the capacity to cross retaliate. In other cases, the
violating country may seek settlement because it is unable or
unwilling to comply. As demonstrated by the Ecuador case, cross
retaliation may also be used as a tool to reach a better
settlement.20 s
One study of the Ecuadorian case describes the benefit of cross
retaliation as a bargaining chip: "Ecuador's innovative request to
cross-retaliate focused on the intellectual property rights . . . in
several sensitive sectors."2 09 The author explains that "[b]y
obtaining this authority, Ecuador signaled its commitment to press
for full compliance ... enhancing its leverage in subsequent
negotiations."2 10 This author concluded that Ecuador's ability to
cross retaliate "appeared to enhance its leverage beyond what
WTO remedies would normally provide a small developing
country." 21' Ecuador not only settled, but also improved its own
market access to the EC. Ecuador's share of the EC banana
market was 14.7 percent in 1998, but it jumped to 17.8 percent
after settlement, and to 20.3 percent by 2002.212 Ecuador and other
banana exporters finally concluded all negotiations with the EC
207 Dunne, supra note 162, at 30; see also Joe Kirwin et al., U.S. and EU End
Decade-long Dispute over EU's Banana Import Regime, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
564, 566 (Apr. 12, 2001).
208 MCCALL SMITH, supra note 12, at 257.
209 Id. at 259.
210 The author further notes that "Ecuador continued to adopt an aggressive stance
by demanding special institutional guarantees that the EU would honor its commitment
to comply fully with the WTO rulings by 2006," which also contributed to its successful
bargaining. Id.
211 Id. at 273.
212 Id. at 277. These improvements occurred under the EC's transitional regime.
Ecuador's bananas were expected to perform even better after the EC came into full
compliance in 2006. Id. at 278.
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about bananas in December 2009.213
A settlement stemming from the right of cross retaliation is
also likely to provide remuneration to the complaining country. In
EC-Banana's III, Ecuador won the right to retaliate up to $201.6
million per year.2 14 In exchange for Ecuador giving up its right of
retaliation, the EC agreed to an import regime for Ecuador that
would be more favorable than the amount of the allowed
retaliation.2 15 In future cases, a complaining party could negotiate
a cash settlement or other preferential trading options, which
would improve its position in the violating country against its
competitors.
However, it is possible that a more powerful violating country
could induce a less powerful complaining country to take a
settlement worth less than the original award.
Since a settlement could help a complaining country avoid the
practical constraints under the second criterion, it may be the only
feasible option for some countries. A settlement would avoid the
legal problems associated with suspending intellectual property
rights. It would also avoid a discussion of the rights under
international treaties like the Berne and Paris Conventions.
Finally, a settlement may be the only feasible option for countries
that have signed TRIPS-plus agreements, since they have already
agreed to stronger intellectual property protections than those
provided under TRIPS.
A settlement may or may not help the complaining country
avoid political problems. The country would still face political
pressure from abroad, but it would be in a better position to
negotiate. The case of Ecuador illustrates this point. Aware of the
pressure it would face from the ACP countries that staunchly
defended their preferential trading relationship with the EC,
Ecuador opted to request the right of cross retaliation to provide a
better bargaining position.21 6 In the end, the benefits of its
negotiation went to the same domestic sector that suffered the
original injury, thus avoiding the criticism that Ecuador was not
supporting its banana sector.
213 Ennis, supra note 67.
214 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, supra note 67.
215 Id.
216 MCCALL SMITH, supra note 12, at 268.
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Finally, settlement avoids issues of control and infrastructure.
The complaining country would not have to devise a monitoring
mechanism to make sure that the material is being distributed
legally. Likewise, the complaining country would not have to
invest in infrastructure to take advantage of the suspension, and
would not have to worry about the valuation concerns, such as the
level of suspension that the country has reached.
A settlement is also likely to satisfy the third criterion,
improving social welfare. This option has the possibility to
improve the welfare for both producers and consumers. Ecuador
provides a good example of a settlement that improves the welfare
of producers. Since Ecuador was ultimately able to compel the EC
to change their bananas regime, the Ecuadorian banana farmers
eventually gained better market access to EC member states.2 17
Under different circumstances, a settlement could also benefit
consumers because it would bring additional revenue into the
country.
Although settlement may at first appear to be the "weakest"
option, and perhaps the only alternative available for the least
developed countries, Ecuador illustrates that this is not the case.
When viewed as one facet of a larger trade-negotiating framework,
settlement can help a country create the type of leverage it needs
to negotiate compliance with a much larger and more powerful
violating country.
Part V. Analysis: The Special Case of Brazil
Brazil has moved swiftly to take advantage of the ruling
following the August 2009 decision. In November 2009, the
government of Brazil issued a list of American goods for which it
was considering imposing tariffs in relation to the upland cotton
dispute.2 18 The list, which contained 222 goods representing about
eleven percent of Brazil's imports from the United States, included
food stuffs, acetaminophen, alkaline batteries, paint, and bar code
readers. 2 19 The list, which did not target intellectual property, was
217 Id. at 273.
218 Bartholomew Sullivan, Brazil readies cotton retaliation against U.S., THE
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Nov. 10, 2009),
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2009/nov/10/brazil-readies-cotton-retaliation/.
219 Id.
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submitted to the U.S. Trade Representative's office for review.
In March 2010, Brazil followed up by issuing a list of 102
goods on which it intended to impose tariffs-totaling $591
million-within thirty days. 22 0 Brazil also indicated its plans to
publish a list of intellectual property slated for cross retaliation,
following a period of public comment. 2 2 1 These announcements
caught the attention of U.S. officials. In April, the United States
agreed to three concessions: 1) $147 million per year in "technical
assistance;" 2) changes to the export credit program that supports
purchasers of U.S. cotton; and 3) efforts to open the U.S. market to
imports of Brazilian meat.222 These concessions were offered as
part of preliminary negotiations for a settlement agreement, and
the United States and Brazil agreed to reach a further agreement
by June 20 10.223
Over the next two months, the United States and Brazil made
progress, but did not resolve the cotton dispute. In June, the
parties reached a "placeholder" agreement, which sets forth a
timeline for future negotiations until 2012, when the current U.S.
Farm Bill is set to expire.22 4 Over the next two years, U.S. and
Brazilian officials will negotiate a settlement as the United States
revises its current Farm Bill, an omnibus bill that governs the form
and substance of federal assistance to American farmers.225 If the
negotiations are successful, the next Farm Bill will be more
favorable toward Brazil and reduce U.S. cotton subsidies.22 6
According to Robert Azevedo, Brazil's ambassador to the WTO,
"this is not a final solution, but it lays out elements that will allow
for consultations and reforms to the Farm Bill that will take place
by the end of 2012.",227 Despite this progress, Brazil is keeping
220 Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Brazil Releases List of US
Goods for Retaliation in Cotton Dispute, BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG. 2 (March 10,
2010), http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweeklyl4-9.pdf.
221 Id.
222 Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development US, Brazil Agree to
Negotiate End to Cotton Dispute, BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG. (Apr. 14, 2010),
http://ictsd.org/iltrade-and-sustainable-development-agenda/73938/.
223 Id.
224 BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG., supra note 20.
225 Id.
226 See id.
227 Alan Beattie, Brazil to suspend action in US cotton dispute, FIN. TIMES (June 18,
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cross retaliation open as a possibility if the negotiations fail. 2 28
Azevedo further stated: "Brazil doesn't rule out taking
countermeasures at any moment." 2 29
Nevertheless, these developments indicate that Brazil does not
plan to cross retaliate-at least not yet. Brazil occupies a special
place among developing countries: it advocates on behalf of
development issues, such as access to medicine, but it also has
very strong industrial capacity.2 30 Since the DSB issued Brazil the
right to cross retaliate after reaching a threshold level of
violations,23 ' their right of cross retaliation in any particular year is
not a given. Even if the threshold is reached, Brazil may opt not to
use it.2 3 2 In light of Brazil's unique position and this constraint,
this section will look at special factors that will influence Brazil's
decision about how to best use its right of cross retaliation.
A. Copyrights
Although Brazil loses a lot of revenue from copyrighted
material through piracy,2 33 it remains a large market for the legal
trade of copyrighted materials, particularly over the Internet.2 34
Brazil is home to 64.9 million Internet users, representing thirty-
three percent of Brazil's population.2 35 The government of Brazil
has worked with the private sector to help reduce the amount of
2010), available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4fbf54cO-7a7 1-1 ldf-9cd7-00144feabdc0.html.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 127, at 950-5 1.
231 Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report, United States - Upland Cotton,
supra note 1, 5.201.
232 The arbitration panel used 2007 as its base year, but the $409.7 million estimated
threshold level for cross retaliation would not have been met then. Theodore R. Posner,
The Brazil-U.S. Cotton Dispute: Brazil Should Think Twice About Intellectual Property-
Focused Retaliation, (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.martindale.com/intellectual-property-
law/article Crowell-Moring-LLP_828242.htm. As of this writing, it is unknown
whether Brazil will meet this threshold level in 2009, although one source estimated that
Brazil is entitled to between $800 and $900 million in sanctions in 2009, including up to
$450 million in cross retaliation. Sullivan, supra note 218.
233 Int'l Intell. Prop. Alliance, supra note 174, at 156.
234 See id.
235 See Brazil, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (Oct. 8, 2010),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html.
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piracy. Such a large market may make this option feasible for
suspension in cross retaliation.
B. Patents
It may be easier for Brazil than most countries to implement a
patent suspension plan. Brazil has plants capable of producing
medicine and has already used the TRIPS Article 31 framework
once before to issue a compulsory license for a pharmaceutical
drug. 237 After the TRIPS Agreement came into effect in 1995, the
Brazilian drug manufacturing industry suffered major losses
because the country had not previously recognized pharmaceutical
patents.23 8 At the same time, however, Brazil was a leader in
establishing universal access to anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs for
HIV/AIDS patients.2 39 Brazil used public facilities to manufacture
ARVs that were not subject to patent protection.24 0
When these drugs eventually came under patent, Brazil used
the threat of issuing compulsory licenses under TRIPS Article 31
as leverage to convince drug manufacturers to provide the drugs to
Brazil at a low price.2 4 1 In April 2007, Brazil issued a compulsory
license for the ARV drug Efavirenz produced by Merck.24 2
Given that Brazil has already used the TRIPS Article 31
exceptions for a compulsory license of pharmaceutical products, it
is possible that it would take it one step further. Brazil could use
its cross retaliation right to suspend Article 31(h),2 43 which
requires providing adequate remuneration to the patent holder.24
236 Int'l Intell. Prop. Alliance, supra note 174, at 155.
237 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 127, at 951.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 127, at 951. Brazil and Thailand are the only
two countries to ever issue a compulsory license under TRIPS Article 31 for a
pharmaceutical drug. Id.
243 This does not necessarily have to happen against the Merck's drug subject to a
compulsory license, but could happen for any drug.
244 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31(h). See also Slater, supra note 16, at
1392 (proposing that retaliating countries able to produce pharmaceuticals domestically
should use their DSB authorization to suspend the obligation to pay adequate
remuneration under Article 31(h)).
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Such a move would not only be available as sanctions, but would
help Brazil continue its goal of providing drugs to its people at a
low cost.
C. Settlement
The DSB's threshold requirement-which prevents Brazil
from using cross retaliation against the United States until a
certain level of sanctions is reached-provides a disincentive to
use the remedy since its use may only be available in certain years.
However, there are other reasons why Brazil might choose to use
the right as leverage but not implement cross retaliation outright.
First, Brazil has an incentive to see the TRIPS Agreement
enforced because it seeks to protect its own sources of intellectual
property.24 5 Brazil is making an effort to develop its oil and
biofuels sectors, which hold patents for deep sea drilling in many
countries. The Brazilian federal government is the majority
owner of Petrobras, the country's largest oil company, and is
considering developing a new state-owned company for drilling in
the "pre-salt" area, which houses the largest oil discovery in the
Americas in the past thirty years.24 7 The new company "most
likely will develop and apply Brazilian technologies.",2 48  Given
Brazil's emergence as a significant producer of intellectual
property, one author suggests that "Brazil has a major stake in
adherence to and vigorous enforcement of the TRIPS
Agreement... [which] should make Brazil loath to take action that
would be seen as undermining that treaty's effectiveness."24 9
Second, Brazil is aware of the importance of protecting
intellectual property in light of its recent winning bid to host the
2016 Summer Olympics. 25 0 The day after Brazil won the bid, it
enacted a law251 to protect the intellectual property related to the
245 Posner, supra note 232.
246 Id.
247 Sarah Vellozzi, Brazilian Government Announces New Development Model for
Pre-Salt Oil Fields, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS 181843+31 -Aug-2009+PRN2009083 1.
248 Posner, supra note 232.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Lei No. 12.035, de 1 de Outubro de 2009, CoL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL.[Law No.
12.035, Oct. 1, 2009].
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Olympics, including the symbols, trademarks, mascot, and song.252
According to one author, "[t]his experience reinforces an
appreciation within the [Brazilian] legal community of the
importance of intellectual property protection." 25 3
Third, Brazil may prefer to seek sanctions that will ultimately
support its domestic cotton industry. Brazil is the fifth largest
producer of cotton, with the United States third.254 In the 2008-
2009 crop year, Brazil produced an estimated 5.7 million bales of
cotton.2 55 However, during this crop year, the area used for cotton
crops decreased by more than twenty percent, in part due to a lack
of adequate financing.2 56 In light of the financial difficulties
facing the Brazilian cotton industry, the government may decide
that it would like the benefits derived from the sanctions to go
directly to this industry as opposed to other industries. Given
Brazil's recent agreement to begin negotiating a settlement with
the United States, it seems likely that Brazil sees this route as its
best option.
Part VI. Conclusion
Brazil's institutional capacities and prominence as an
economic power, make it one of the developing countries most
capable of successfully implementing cross retaliation. As the
world's tenth largest economy and with a population of almost 200
million,25 7 Brazil is increasingly a powerful spokesperson for
developing country interests. Brazil's use of cross retaliation as a
policy instrument will likely inform how developing countries use
the remedy in the future. In terms of how to implement cross
retaliation, Brazil's interests are best served either through patent
252 Posner, supra note 232.
253 Id.
254 Jennifer M. Freedman, WTO Allows Brazil to Sanction U.S. Over Cotton Aid
(Update4), BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiQRd2Sc4Mdw.
255 ELIZABETH AUTRY, BRAZIL COTTON & PRODUCTS ANNUAL, USDA FAS GAIN
No. BR9614 (Apr. 15, 2009),
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%2OPublications/Commodity%20Report COT
TON%20AND%20PRODUCTS%20ANNUALBrasiliaBrazil4-15-2009.pdf.
256 Id. at 3. The contraction primarily occurred in the state of Mato Grosso, where
credit was particularly difficult to receive and transportation costs increased. Id. at 3-4.
257 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 235.
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suspension or through settlement, rather than copyright
suspension.
Patent suspension-particularly in the pharmaceutical
context-would lend itself well to Brazil's strengths. Brazil has
already built the infrastructure necessary to reproduce
pharmaceutical drugs and has already used the TRIPS Agreement
Article 31 framework to reproduce ARV drugs for HIV/AIDS
without the consent of patent holders. From this perspective, it
would be relatively easy for Brazil to suspend TRIPS Article
31(h), which currently requires Brazil to provide "adequate
remuneration" to the drug manufacturer.2 5 8 Furthermore, Brazil
has already subjected itself to political criticism by invoking the
Article 31 mechanism for anti-retroviral drugs, and has developed
strategies for handling such political pressure. Since patent
suspension would be the next step in reproducing drugs and would
not be a completely new course of action for Brazil, patent
suspension is a more viable option in Brazil than in other
countries.
Patent suspension is also likely to provide many benefits to
Brazil. Such a regime would affirm Brazil's rights, either by
inducing the United States to comply with the WTO ruling or by
providing remuneration to Brazil for the harmful cotton subsidies.
In this way, Brazil should realize significant social welfare
benefits. Brazil can continue its goal to provide universal access
to HIV/AIDS medication and possibly provide other health
services as well. By improving public health, Brazil will likely
improve its economy and reduce domestic income inequality.
Settlement would also be a viable option for Brazil. As
Ecuador illustrated in EC - Bananas III, settlement can be used in
a very calculated manner to help the complaining country induce
compliance from the violating country. Just as Ecuador ultimately
negotiated with the EC to change their trading preferences for
bananas, Brazil may be able to use cross retaliation as leverage to
surmount the strong U.S. agricultural interests and negotiate
reform. Brazil could also use the right of cross retaliation as
leverage for negotiating with the United States on the Doha
Development Agenda. The Doha Round is the WTO's latest
round of trade negotiations, ongoing since 2001, where members
258 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31(h).
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are negotiating a global free trade agreement.25 9 In either case, the
right of cross retaliation should provide considerable negotiating
space for Brazil with the United States.
Settlement may be the most practical option for Brazil given
its limited right of cross retaliation. Since Brazil is only allowed
to cross retaliate once a certain threshold of sanctions has been
met-a threshold which may not be met in any particular year-it
may be too expensive for Brazil to cross retaliate without knowing
for certain whether the policy option would be available in the
next year. In this context, it might be more prudent for Brazil to
seek a settlement or to choose only to retaliate in goods.
Settlement would also avoid the extra political costs of cross
retaliation as well as any problems with monitoring or compliance.
Settlement has a good chance of improving social welfare. If
Brazil can negotiate a settlement that is better for Brazilian
farmers, this will be a major accomplishment. Brazil and many
developing countries have been pushing for U.S. agricultural
reform for years, and were hoping that the Doha Round of trade
negotiations would produce an agreement that was better for their
farmers.2 60 With no resolution to Doha on the horizon, Brazil is
looking for a private remedy to improve international trade for its
cotton farmers.26 1
Copyright suspension, on the other hand, would fail to take
advantage of some of the attainable benefits under other strategies.
While Brazil has a large market for copyrighted entertainment
goods, the government may have a very difficult time monitoring
the use of copyright suspended material. Considering that one
source estimates that Brazil already sees nearly fifty percent of its
potential revenue from copyrighted material lost to illegal
downloads,2 62 this remedy might not be as effective as Brazil had
hoped. Copyright suspension may lead to increased scrutiny from
the United States and other countries, as well as present a
challenge of determining the correct suspension value.
259 For more information on the Doha Round, see World Trade Org., Doha
Development Agenda: Negotiations, implementation and development,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/ddae/ddae.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
260 See, e.g., Ewing & Riveras, supra note 13.
261 Id.
262 Int'l Intell. Prop. Alliance, supra note 174, at 2.
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Copyright suspension would not provide the same social
welfare benefits as patent suspension or settlement, as most of the
benefit would go to the companies that procured the government
licenses. While the copyrighted material may provide
entertainment and some educational value, it may not be nearly as
meaningful as the public health benefits derived from patent
suspension or the agricultural or other benefits derived from
settlement.
Cross retaliation provides WTO members with a unique policy
tool to hold parties accountable for continuing trade violations.
Previous research has identified some possible mechanisms for
implementing cross retaliation: suspension of copyrights (with a
focus on the entertainment industry), suspension of patents (with a
focus on the pharmaceutical industry), and settlement. From a
public policy perspective, there are benefits and pitfalls to each
approach. When these models are applied to the most recent case
on point, the dispute between Brazil and the United States over
U.S. subsidies on upland cotton, Brazil is likely to exercise its
option to cross retaliate through patent suspension or settlement.
Ultimately, Brazil's case will provide more guidance on how a
developing country can creatively use the cross retaliation policy
instrument in the future.
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